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THE MAKING OF UNITED STATES REFUGEE POLICY:
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE POST-COLD WAR
ERA
Stephen H. Legomsky*
INTRODUCTION
Readers of this symposium do not need a long dissertation on the
increased visibility of international migration. Evidence that immigration
has fully emerged as a core issue is everywhere. It has occupied the
attention of Congress, the White House, the rapidly expanding relevant
federal agencies, state and local governments, political campaigns, the
media, the business world, the practicing Bar, the courts, law schools,
scholarly journals across a range of disciplines, and people engaged in
plain everyday conversation.
There are many reasons for this recent surge of interest, but one of
them, surely, is the growing public recognition that immigration has a
major impact on the lives of all who live here. My own view is that on
balance that major impact has been overwhelmingly positive, as
immigrants continue to contribute to our economy and to enrich us
culturally and spiritually.' But whether or not one shares that view, all
can agree that the impact of immigration policy-both on the prospective
immigrants and on the larger society-is immense.
Apart from its massive impact on the life and history of our country,
immigration policy has two other characteristics that are pertinent to the
themes explored later in this article. One is the role of subjective values
in shaping immigration policy. More so than any other area of law, our
immigration policies quite literally define who we are as a people and
what qualities we admire and disdain in others. Consequently, the
formulation of immigration policy requires value judgments about the
optimal size of our population, the composition of our society, and our
general economic direction. Immigration policy requires us to prioritize
* Charles F. Nagel Professor of International and Comparative Law, Washington University. I thank
Alex Aleinikoff, Louis Henkin, Kevin Johnson, Ronald Mann, Robert Pauw, and the symposium editors
of the Washington Law Review for their many thoughtfil comments.
I. Stephen -I. Legomsky, A Distorted View of Immigrants, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 23,
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among reuniting families, addressing our economic needs, fulfilling
humanitarian obligations to refugees from persecution, and admitting any
other categories of prospective immigrants. It also requires decisions
about our law enforcement needs and strategies, about foreign affairs,
and about nationalism, community, autonomy, citizenship, and civil
liberties.
With so much at stake, it is not surprising that immigration policy has
one other feature relevant here: It has attracted a wide variety of interest
groups to the debate 2 They include ethnic and religious organizations,
labor unions, industry representatives, civil rights and international
human rights organizations, business interests, environmental and
population restriction groups, law enforcement agencies, and units of
state and local government.
Thus, there are three features of immigration policy to consider in
combination: First, its repercussions are powerful and widespread.
Second, with so many conflicting priorities to juggle, the decisions
depend heavily on personal values and ideologies. Third, with so many
different interest groups in the mix, decisions on immigration policy tend
to be shamelessly vulnerable to constituent pressures. What all three
factors have in common is that they accentuate the importance of
choosing the right decisionmaker. The high impact means that much is at
stake, and the last two features mean that the results will often turn on
who the decisionmakers are.
On that score, recent trends are significant. Over the past fifteen years,
for reasons on which I speculate below, Congress has seized the
immigration initiative more forcefully than in the past. While large
pockets of executive discretion remain, Congress has increasingly been
making substantive policy decisions that in former years it had happily
delegated to the executive branch.
With all this, however, there has been one gaping exception to the
pattern of increased congressional control. In the Refugee Act of 19803
Congress virtually wrote the President a blank check to decide how many
overseas refugees to admit and which ones. Exercising this power, the
various Presidents have collectively authorized almost two million
refugee admissions since 1980. 4 Presidents have generously admitted
2. See generally Peter H. Schuck, The Emerging Political Consensus on Immigration Law, 5 Geo.
Imrnmigr. L.J. 1 (1991).
3. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
4. Authorizations for fiscal years 1980 through 1994 are listed in Stephen H. Legomsky,
Immigration Law and Policy 47-48 (Supp. 1994). These add up to 1,812,700. The 1995
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those refugees fleeing Communist countries while largely turning a deaf
ear to almost all others. I believe that these patterns were inevitable as
long as presidents were the decisionmakers and the Cold War was
raging.
The demise of Communism will certainly necessitate a fundamental
rethinking of the substantive direction of United States refugee policy.
The point here, though, is that these same geopolitical changes also
require us to rethink the very process by which those substantive refugee
selection decisions are made.
This article argues for a new, independent Board whose job it would
be to make annual determinations of how many overseas refugees the
United States is to admit and which classes of refugees will comprise the
pool. To that end, part I surveys recent congressional trends in the
allocation of federal power generally and immigration powers
particularly. Part II examines some basic theories of separation of powers
and compares the suitability of the legislative and executive branches for
performing functions analytically classifiable as lawmaking. In part III, I
argue that neither Congress nor the President is well situated to make
annual refugee allotments, either alone or in combination. Part IV
proposes the creation of an Independent Refugee Board to which that
responsibility should be substantially transferred.
I. SOME RECENT TRENDS IN CONGRESSIONAL
DECISIONMAKING
A. Public Law Generally
In recent years, those who write on separation of powers have
described and criticized perceived patterns of congressional
decisionmaking. Two broad themes emerge from the literature: that
Congress has been going too far and that Congress has not been going far
enough. In the eyes of some, Congress has become an overzealous
institution, ever ready to micromanage the executive branch. In the eyes
of others, Congress has become a sluggish body increasingly happy to
delegate broad powers to the executive.
There is truth in both descriptions. Many would trace the roots of
modem congressional activism back to Watergate and the constitutional
crisis of the early 1970s. In response to broad assertions of presidential
authorization is 112,000. U.S. Comm. for Refugees, 15 Refugee Reports No. 12, at 20 (1994). Total
authorizations through 1995 are therefore 1,924,700.
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power, House Speaker Carl Albert and Senate Majority Leader Mike
Mansfield opened the 93rd Congress with bold speeches that called for a
more assertive congressional role.' The resulting congressional
resurgence continues today. Through a combination of more detailed
legislation, expanded committee oversight of administrative agencies,
and, for a while, legislative vetoes,7 congressional power has become a
leading growth industry.' That growth has generated criticism,
principally from the political right.9
Congress has also received flak for delegating too much of its power
to the executive.'" Some such criticisms come, ironically, from the same
people who condemn what they see as congressional micro-
management."
In theory, broad delegations of congressional power should not occur.
In two leading 1935 cases, the Supreme Court struck down congressional
attempts to delegate virtually unlimited regulatory discretion.2 At the
heart of this "nondelegation doctrine" is the conviction that the people's
representatives should not escape their duty to make difficult policy
5. James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress 1 (1981)1. Speaker Albert listed
four examples of President Nixon's expanded claims of authority: his impoundment of funds
appropriated by Congress, his escalation of the war in Vietnam, his claims of executive privilege to
withhold information from Congress, and his reorganization of executive branch departments along
lines previously rejected by Congress. Id. at 1-2.
6. See generally id. at 199-414; The Imperial Congress-Crisis in the Separation of Powers
(Gordon S. Jones & John A. Marini eds., 1988) [hereinafter Jones & Marini].
7. See generally James Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to
Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 Ind. L. Rev. 323 (1977). Legislative vetoes
have since been declared unconstitutional. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Peter L. Strauss,
Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision,
1983 Duke L.J. 789.
8. These patterns extend even to such bastions of presidential power as foreign affairs, Louis
Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy, andForeign Affairs 30 (1990), and oversight of the Defense
Department, Herman A. Mellor, Congressional Micromanagement: National Defense, in Jones &
Marini, supra note 6, at 107-29.
9. E.g., Mellor, supra note 8; Newt Gingrich, Foreword to Jones & Mariri, supra note 6, at ix-x;
Jones & Marini, supra note 6, at 1-13; Charles R. Kesler, Separation of Powers and the
Administrative State, in Jones & Marini, supra note 6, at 20-40.
10. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-
88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) [sometimes cited as the Benzene Case]; David Schoenbrod,
Power Without Responsibility-How Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation (1993);
Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, 4 Reg. 25 (July-Aug. 1980); Note, Nondelegation After
Mistretta: Phoenix or Phaithon?, 31 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1047 (1990) [hereinafter Nondelegation].
11. Jones & Marini, supra note 6, at 1.
12. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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choices.13 John Locke captured that theme with his now famous
aphorism, drawn from the social contract theory: The people have given
the Legislature the power "only to make Laws, and not to make
Legislators." 4 Justice Story felt the same way. Since Congress has only
whatever powers the Constitution delegates it, he argued, and since in his
view "a delegated authority cannot be delegated," Congress could not
subdelegate to the executive branch. 5 Still others have objected that,
without intelligible standards, congressional delegations of power
invariably require judges to supply the missing content.'6
In practice, however, no congressional action has been struck down on
nondelegation grounds since 1935; 7 the Supreme Court has routinely
upheld even those delegations that are clearly devoid of meaningful
standards.' Today, the major limitation that the courts at least profess to
recognize is that, when delegating power, Congress must provide an
"intelligible principle" for the delegatee to apply.' While some advocate
resuscitating the nondelegation doctrine,2" the complexities and
specialization of the modem age and the practical difficulties of
articulating meaningful standards make dramatic change of that sort
unlikely. At bottom, the debate over the nondelegation doctrine raises
broader issues concerning the attributes of Congress and the Executive
and their respective roles in a representative democracy. Part II.C below
will consider those issues in more detail.
13. See Nondelegation, supra note 10, at 1081-82; Ernest Gellhom, Returning to First Principles,
36 Am. U. L. Rev. 345,347-48 (1987).
14. See Nondelegation, supra note 10, at 1053-54.
15. See Shankland v. Washington, 30 U.S. 390,395 (1831).
16. E.g., Scalia, supra note 10, at 28; cf Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (standardless delegation makes judicial review problematic). Some of these themes arise
in more specific debates about the propriety of independent agencies and will be taken up in part IV.
17. See Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law § 2.5 (3d ed. 1991).
18. See id. §§ 2.5-2.7. This has been true even when the delegation involves a "core"
congressional power, such as the taxing power. Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212
(1989).
19. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,372 (1989).
20. E.g., Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 675
(Rehnquist, ., concurring) (1980); Scalia, supra note 10; J. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary
Justice, 81 Yale LI. 575, 582-87 (1972).
21. See, eg., Schwartz, supra note 17, § 2.2; Scalia, supra note 10, at 27.
Washington Law Review
B. Congressional Decisionmaking Patterns in Immigration Law
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized a "plenary"
congressional power to 'regulate immigration,' and Congress has
consistently exercised that plenary power in an expansive way. As in
other subject areas, the detail with which the United States Congress has
managed immigration policy is especially vivid in comparison with the
statutory schemes that are in place in some of the parliamentary
democracies.
In the United States, the basic immigration statute is the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), as amended.' Depending on the
typesize, the statute runs 300-400 pages. 4 In spellbinding detail, it lays
out formulas for calculating the maximum number of immigrants who
may be admitted in a given year, worldwide and from a single country.'
It prescribes, too, the substantive credentials those immigrants must
possess, the affirmative exclusion grounds they must avoid, and the
precise circumstances in which specified exclusion grounds may be
waived.26 It also lays out the basic procedures to be followed in
implementing those substantive criteria.27 That structure is in sharp
contrast to immigration statutes in the parliamentary democracies, where,
for reasons discussed later, the national legislatures typically expect the
executive branch to fill in more of the policy details, both substantive
and procedural.28
The pattern repeats itself when the subject shifts from admission to
deportation. In the United States, there are well over thirty separate
22. I have explored that subject in two previous companion pieces, see generally Stephen H.
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev.
255 (evaluating the substantive soundness of plenary power); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration
and the Judiciary: Law and Politics in Britain and America 177-222 (1987) [hereinafter Legomsky,
Immigration and Judiciary] (examining and critiquing the historical development of plenary power);
and in one follow-up piece, Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration,
Congress, and the Courts, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. (forthcoming 1995). In all those writings the
emphasis was on the division of responsibility between Congress and the courts; here the concern is
with the relationship between Congress and the executive.
23. Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163.
24. See, e.g., the edited version that appears in, Immigration and Nationclity Laws of the United
States 1-343 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff& David A. Martin eds., 1992).
25. INA §§ 201-03, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-53 (1994).
26. INA §§ 201-03,212,8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-53, 1182.
27. INA §§ 204-05,211-40, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154-55, 1181-1230.
28. See, e.g., Immigration Act 1971 (U.K.); Immigration Act 1987 (N.Z.).
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grounds on which an alien may be deported.29 In contrast, the United
Kingdom's statute lays out only four specific deportation grounds and
additionally empowers the Home Secretary to deport any other non-U.K.
citizen whenever the Secretary "deems his deportation to be conducive to
the public good."3 Similarly, while the United States statute enumerates
a series of specific fact situations in which the executive officials may
waive deportation,3 the New Zealand statute simply authorizes the
Minister of Immigration to cancel a removal order when "exceptional
circumstances of a humanitarian nature [would make removal] unjust or
unduly harsh" and "it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to
the public interest to allow the appellant to remain."32
In recent years the trend has been toward yet more detailed
congressional management of immigration policy. Many examples could
be furnished, and I start with one of the weakest. The Refugee Act of
198033 codified and structured key components of United States refugee
and asylum policies. Until then, the usual device for admitting overseas
refugees had been the parole provision, under which the Attorney
General has the discretion to "parole into the United States temporarily
under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for
reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for
admission to the United States."34 Disturbed by the breadth of the
resulting executive discretion, Congress in 1980 prohibited the Attorney
General from paroling refugees, in the absence of "compelling reasons in
the public interest with respect to that particular alien."35 In place of
parole, Congress created a more structured program that requires formal
consultations between the President's Cabinet-level designees and
congressional committees, public hearings, annual presidential
announcements as to the numbers and categories of refugee admissions,
and continuing congressional oversight.36
29. The deportation grounds are hard to count. INA § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994), contain
five sets of deportation grounds. Almost every set contains several separate grounds, many of which
contain nested sublevels of additional grounds.
30. Immigration Act 1971, §§ 3.5,3.6 and sched. 2, 9 (U.K.).
31. These situations are surveyed in Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and Policy, 515-
605 (1992).
32. Immigration Act 1987, § 63 (N.Z.).
33. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
34. INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1994).
35. Id. § 212(d)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(B).
36. Id. § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157. For more detail, see infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
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To be sure, the President's power to decide the size and shape of each
year's refugee class is an exceptionally broad delegation of authority.
Indeed, I see it as the clearest counterexample to my thesis that Congress
generally dominates United States immigration policy, and for that and
other reasons I discuss the refugee program separately in parts III and IV
below. The point here, however, is that even in this admittedly wide
domain of executive power the recent trend has been one of slightly
increased congressional control.
The Refugee Act of 1980 restricted executive discretion in other ways
as well. Before 1980, the statute had given the Attorney General the
discretion not to deport an alien to a country in which he or she would be
subject to specified forms of persecution." The Refugee Act removed
that discretion, making nonrefoulement mandato:ry rather than
discretionary.38
Similarly, before 1980 there had been no statutory authority for
granting asylum. The Justice Department in 1974 had issued
administrative regulations creating discretionary asylum and spelling out
the qualifying criteria.39 The Refugee Act preserved "the discretionary
component of asylum but rewrote and codified the eligibility
requirements.
40
Other examples of recent congressional assertiveness can be found in
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), a major
legislative attempt to stem illegal migration. Both before and after IRCA,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has possessed a broad
discretion in allocating its enforcement resources and in deciding which
deportable aliens to apprehend and to deport.4' There are specific
statutory relief provisions that selected categories of otherwise
deportable aliens may invoke, but under almost all of those provisions
37. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1952).
38. At the same time, Congress extended nonrefoulement from the deportation setting to the
exclusion setting. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (1980). Both the change from
discretionary to mandatory relief and the extension of section 243(h) to excladed aliens were meant
to conform United States statutory law to its treaty obligations. In 1968, the United States had
acceded to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. By that accession the United States agreed to follow the 1951
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.r.S. 137, article 33.1 of
which had mandated "nonrefoulement", the international term for the ncnreturn of refugees to
countries of persecution.
39. 39 Fed. Reg. 28,439 (1974).
40. See INA § 208,8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994).
41. See, e.g., Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979).
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relief rests ultimately on the favorable exercise of INS discretion.42 Not
so with IRCA. One of its pillars was a series of legalization programs
intended to grant permanent resident status to millions of undocumented
aliens. Two of those provisions-the general legalization program43 and
a special program for agricultural workers"4 -set specific eligibility
requirements and required the INS to legalize the statuses of all aliens
who met those requirements. Neither determination permitted the
exercise of INS discretion.45
IRCA also created a new "H-2A" program specifically for temporary
agricultural workers.' Temporary workers had already been eligible to
enter under the general H-2 category, but the procedures were so
cumbersome that by the time the workers arrived perishable crops were
often rotting in the fields.47 Rather than allow the INS to use its
discretion in deciding whether to give agricultural workers special
priority over other temporary workers, Congress made the decision itself.
The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 (IMFA)48
signaled further congressional anxiety about executive policymaking and
even executive factfinding. IMFA significantly reduced the INS's
freedom to make case-by-case determinations of the genuineness of
aliens' marriages. Under IMFA, fixed rules impose a blanket two-year
probationary period on almost every immigrant who is admitted on the
basis of a marriage that is less than two years old.49 Moreover, if an alien
marries during either exclusion or deportation proceedings, the INS is
prohibited from finding the marriage bona fide without "clear and
convincing evidence" of genuineness, unless the alien spouse first leaves
the United States for at least two years following the wedding."0 In each
case, a statutory presumption has replaced or constrained INS fact-
finding.
42. See Legomsky, supra note 3 1.
43. INA § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (1994).
44. INA § 210,8 U.S.C. § 1160.
45. See INA § 210(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § ll60(a)(1) ("The Attorney General shall adjust the status of
any alien... .") (emphasis added); INA § 245A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(1) (same wording).
46. INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(A).
47. See generally Maurice A. Roberts & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Understanding the 1986
Immigration Law 4-1 to 4-16 (1987); Stephen Yale-Loehr, Foreign Farm Workers in the US.: The
Impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 15 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 333
(1986-87).
48. Act of Nov. 10, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537.
49. INA § 216, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (1994).
50. INA § 204(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(g).
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Numerous recent statutes have also confined the INS's discretion to
prioritize the deportation of aliens convicted of crimes. Various crime
and drug abuse statutes, for example, have mandated expeditious
deportation hearings, detention for certain criminal aliens pending those
hearings, speedy removal, and in some cases in absentia deportation
hearings."
The Immigration Act of 199052 contains a number of provisions that
represent similar transfers of policy discretion from the executive to the
Congress. Among other things, this Act adds statutory detail to the
procedures for obtaining labor certification; to the substantive eligibility
requirements for alien managers, business executives, treaty traders,
temporary workers, trainees, athletes, entertainers, and others; and to the
criteria and procedures for admitting intracompany transfierees.53
The same Act rendered aggravated felons automatically ineligible for
various forms of INS discretion, including both asylum and relief for
certain long-term lawful permanent residents.54 The Act also eliminates
the INS discretion to grant certain forms of otherwise available relief in
the cases of aliens who fail to show up at designated kinds of
immigration proceedings.55 And the Act replaces "extended voluntary
departure," an open-ended vehicle that the Attorney General had used to
delay the removal of aliens to war zones and other danger areas, with
"temporary protected status" (TPS), a program that codifies and confines
the Attorney General's discretion to designate such countries.56 Congress
in fact took an additional step, deciding on its own to designate El
Salvador as a TPS country.
There are reasons to find this increased congressional management of
immigration policy surprising. As society's problems become more
complex, and as solutions to those problems become more technical, one
might expect Congress generally to entrust more and more of the
decisionmaking to specialized administrative agencies with narrower
expertise. Since the complexity of immigration issues has increased in
51. See, e.g., INA §§ 242A, 242B, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252a, 1252b.
52. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
53. Id. §§ 122-23,204-07.
54. Id. §§ 515, 511.
55. Id. § 545.
56. Id. § 302, creating INA § 244A, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a. See especially INA § 244A(g), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254A(g), which makes temporary protected status "the exclusive autlority of the Attorney
General under law to permit aliens ... to remain in the United States temporarily because of their
particular nationality or region of foreign state of nationality."
57. Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 303, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
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Refugee Policy and Separation of Powers
particularly noticeable ways, one might expect this subject area to be one
in which Congress is especially happy to delegate much of the problem-
solving to the Justice Department. To many members of Congress,
immigration is also a political hot potato for which broad delegation
might seem particularly inviting.
Yet, as just shown, precisely the opposite has occurred. The obvious
question is why Congress would systematically reclaim this power from
the executive at a time when the heightened technical complexity and the
political risks associated with immigration might make greater reliance
on specialized agencies attractive. On this I can only speculate. Four
possible explanations, however, come to mind.
First, throughout almost the entire period described in this section, the
Congress and the Presidency have been controlled by two opposing
political parties. Under those circumstances, Congress has an added
incentive to make more of the decisions itself rather than permit the
President or his Administration to do so.
Second, more and more members of Congress have become interested
in immigration. As their staffs become ever more conversant with that
subject, they develop the confidence to take on issues that they might
previously have welcomed the opportunity to slough off. And if they are
not immersed in immigration issues already, the proliferation of interest
groups might force them to become immersed.
Third, the INS traditionally has not been an agency in which Congress
has displayed great confidence. My own view is that the last two
Commissioners-Gene McNary and Doris Meissner-have worked hard
to restore public faith in the INS. But the problems run deep, and until
they are solved Congress might continue to make many of the policy
decisions that it would otherwise have been inclined to delegate.
Fourth, and most cynically, the heightened degree of congressional
management might reflect the populist sound-bite politics that have
increasingly infected immigration and other hot-button issues. As the
public more and more associates immigration policy with criminal and
national security issues, absolutism in dealing with alien criminal
offenders commands ever widening public appeal. Executive officials
who administer the immigration laws might very much prefer to retain
some measure of discretion for unusually compassionate cases or for
prying information from minor players in large conspiracies, but
Washington Law Review
members of Congress might prefer the political benefits of clarity and
perceived "toughness."5'
I certainly recognize that several major pockets of broad
administrative discretion remain in immigration. Some are noted below. I
am suggesting only that there seems to be a higher degree of
congressional management of immigration policy, and a correspondingly
smaller area of administrative discretion, than (a) there used to be and (b)
there are, for example, in the parliamentary democracies.
Probably the largest reservoir of executive discretion in immigration
today is the overseas refugee program. Each year the President, subject
to the constraints discussed above, decides how many refugees will be
admitted and from which regions or countries they will be drawn.5 9
Within those broad parameters, the Attorney General then decides which
subcategories of refugees and which individual applican'ts to accept.6°
There are other areas of broad administrative discretion. Even in an
era of serious congressional committee oversight, the Attorney General
and her delegates retain wide latitude in developing law enforcement
priorities and strategies," in implementing temporary protected status,62
in granting parole in individual cases,' and in making discretionary
judgments whether to waive deportation in certain statutorily prescribed
fact situations."
But the basic pattern remains intact: growing congressional
management of United States immigration policy. How does this pattern
square with fundamental theories of separation of powers? And what
attributes of legislative and executive decisionmaking structures are
relevant to the proper allocation of government power?
58. Credit for this thought goes to my colleague, Ronald Mann.
59. INA § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1994).
60. Id. § 207(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1); Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, The
Implementation of the Refugee Act of 1980: A Decade of Experience (Mar. 1990). For that purpose,
the State Department and the INS have jointly developed a list of priority categories. Id.
61. See INA § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103.
62. INA § 244A, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a.
63. INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
64. For a description of the various statutory relief provisions, see Legomsky, supra note 31.
'Vol. 70:675, 1995
Refugee Policy and Separation of Powers
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS
A. Theories and Strategies for Separating Powers
A strong central government carries obvious potential for abuse of
power. Like Montesquieu, James Madison identified separation of
powers as one vital antidote to protect individual liberty." The idea was
that "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, . . . may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny."66 Unlike Montesquieu,67 however, Madison was
quick to add that separation of powers does not prohibit one branch
having partial control over the actions of other branches. The situation
that separation of powers is meant to avoid is that in which "the whole
power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess
the whole power of another department." 68
Good government is sometimes said to be another objective of
separation of powers. The theory here is that different branches are
particularly well situated to perform certain specific functions-a large
assembly to deliberate, a hierarchial executive to implement laws, and so
on.69 These and other attributes of legislative and executive bodies will
be examined presently in more detail.
As Woodrow Wilson was eager to point out, separation of powers
does not have to rest on as strict a system of checks and balances as has
been adopted in the United States." He saw our governmental structure
as an unconscious replication of Newton's theory of the universe. Just as
the heavenly bodies are in equipoise because the opposing physical
forces offset and constrain one another, so too the framers set off the
three branches against each other to prevent any one force from totally
overcoming the others. The problem Wilson perceived in that approach
was that government, unlike the heavens, is a living thing. For him,
65. The Federalist No. 47 (Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) [hereinafter Federalist Papers].
See also Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) (portraying separation of
powers as device for protecting individual liberty).
66. Federalist Papers, supra note 65, No. 47 at 324.
67. Montesquieu advocated a stricter separation than that represented by the United States system
of checks and balances. See Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of
Powers, 85 Mich. 592,597 (1986).
68. Federalist Papers, supra note 65, No. 47, at 325-26.
69. See, e.g., Kesler, supra note 9, at 27-29.
70. Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 54-57 (1908). Fortunately,
he adds, our government is elastic enough to break free of its Newtonian origins, and the Presidency
has been shaped by the personalities of its occupants. Id. at 57-59.
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Darwin's theory of organic life, in which organisms are modified by their
environments and in which success requires some community of
purpose, would therefore have been a better model to follow. Rather than
set the organs of government against one another, 'Wilson felt, the
framers should have relied more heavily on the cooperation of the
constituent parts.
For present purposes, the relevant question becomes how best to
allocate the federal lawmaking power between the legislative and
executive branches.7' As to that, I consider only the wisdom of different
models, not their constitutionality.72 Nonetheless, considerations that
have influenced the constitutional development of the nondelegation
doctrine discussed earlier are relevant also at this mo:re general level.
They include, on the one hand, the observations that the people intended
to delegate broad lawmaking power only to the legislative branch and
that broad congressional delegations of authority to the executive branch
can lead indirectly to further lawmaking by unelected judges unless
Congress provides intelligible standards for courts to apply. On the other
hand, as was also discussed in connection with nondelegation, the
technical complexity of modem legislative issues and the practical
difficulties in fashioning meaningful statutory standards would make
strict adherence to nondelegation principles problematic.
Perhaps the best way to place the United States approach for
allocating lawmaking functions between Congress and the executive in
perspective is to contrast it with the approaches taken in the United
Kingdom and many other parliamentary democracies. In the United
States at least the major policy decisions are generally the products of
legislation. In contrast, in many parliamentary democracies the national
legislature often expressly delegates more sweeping powers to the
executive branch. It often reinforces that result more subtly by legislating
71. 1 am taking as a given that Congress does not exercise all the lawmiddng powers; certainly
both rulemaking and the interpretation of law by administrative tribunals located within the
executive branch are today important sources of "lawmaking" in every sense of the word. Nor, even
though I am confining myself to the allocation of power between the legislative and executive
branches, do I dispute that the judiciary also performs critical "lawmaking" functions. As to the
latter, see Legomsky, Immigration and Judiciary, supra note 22, at 235-41.
72. As for constitutionality, see, e.g., Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952) [sometimes cited as the Steel Seizure Case]; Michael J. Glennon, Ccnstitutional Diplomacy
(1990). For a thoughtful discussion of separation of powers in the specific context of foreign affairs,
see Henkin, supra note 8.
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in such broad, general language that as a practical matter the executive
branch has to make policyjust to apply the statute.73
There are substantial reasons for the United States Congress to guard
its policymaking power more jealously than do its parliamentary
counterparts. Most of those reasons stem from the relatively greater
distance between the legislative and executive branches in the United
States. As I have discussed elsewhere:
The monarch in the UK is bound by convention to appoint as Prime
Minister the leader of the largest party in the House of Commons.
The other Ministers, also appointed by the monarch, will be
whomever the Prime Minister recommends. All Ministers must
themselves be members of either House of Parliament. Thus, the
first point to note is that the selection of all the Ministers rests
ultimately on the composition of Parliament. In the United States,
by contrast, the President is independently elected by the people.
As a result, the probability of a serious ideological rift between the
legislative and executive branches is less in the UK than in the US
[even during those years in which the same political party controls
Congress and the Presidency]. It follows that, with all other factors
constant, Parliament would be less hesitant than Congress to
delegate broad discretionary powers to the executive branch....
The counection between the legislative and executive branches is
closer in the UK than it is in the US for the additional reason that
Parliament may oust the government from office by a vote of no
confidence. The United States Congress has no such power and,
because the President serves a fixed four-year term, the political
check on the executive branch is weaker.74
That the United States Congress has less legal control over the
composition of the executive branch" than is the case in some of the
73. See, e.g., Legomsky, Immigration and Judiciary, supra note 22, at 260 (comparing United
States to United Kingdom); Stephen H. Legomsky, Specialized Justice-Courts, Administrative
Tribunals, and a Cross-National Theory of Specialization 86 (1990) (comparing United States to
New Zealand) [hereinafter Legomsky, Specialized Justice].
74. Legomsky, Immigration and Judiciary, supra note 22, at 259-60. For similar reasons,
executive agencies in New Zealand tend to receive broader grants of discretion than do their
American counterparts. Legomsky, Specialized Justice, supra note 73, at 86.
75. The Senate, of course, does have the responsibility for confirming important presidential
appointments. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. But Congress has no role in choosing the President or
Vice-President and, except for impeachment, see id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; id. art. II, § 4, has no power to
replace them.
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parliamentary democracies might lead one to assume that Congress is
less powerful than its parliamentary analogs. Indeed, that impression
might be fortified when one considers that, at least in the United
Kingdom76 and New Zealand,77 Parliament is the supreme legal
authority,78 the United States Congress, in contrast, is subordinate to the
Constitution.7
9
But that theoretical contrast between omnipotent parliaments and a
weak United States Congress is highly misleading; in fact, the United
States Congress wields far more power vis-a-vis the executive branch
than is the case in the parliamentary democracies. The New Zealand
example is illustrative:
[T]he overriding reality of the New Zealand system is that the
Cabinet drives Parliament, not vice versa. All major decisions are
made by Cabinet, and it is a Cabinet minister who ordinarily
introduces bills. All bills must be cleared by caucus, but a united
Cabinet ordinarily has little difficulty prevailing in caucus. The
members of Parliament are either formally pledged -to support the
position of their party's caucus or bound in practice to do so; this
tight party discipline makes it "very rare indeed for MP's to cross
the floor of the House." And once Parliament votes, only the
virtually pro forma royal assent is required before the bill becomes
law. Consequently, executive proposals are rarely defelated.
The United States system stands in stark contrast. Party discipline
is much less stringent, and an independently elected President can
in any event be of a different political party from the majority of
Congress.80
76. Edinburgh & Dalkeith Ry. v. Wauchop:, 8 E.R. 279 (H.L. 1842).
77. See Sir Geoffrey Palmer, Unbridled Power-An Interpretation of New Zealand's Constitution
and Government 186-89 (2d ed. 1987). As in the United Kingdom, Parliament is supreme. See, e.g.,
Fitzgerald v. Muldoon, 2 N.Z.L.R. 615 (1976) (holding that English Bill of Rights 1688 prohibits
executive branch of New Zealand government from interfering with Parliameat).
78. Not all parliamentary democracies follow the constitutional models of the United Kingdom
and New Zealand. In Canada, India, and Australia, for example, the parliaraents are subject to the
national constitutions. See Constitution Act 1982, Sched. B, § 52(1), reproduced in 4 Constitutions
of the World 118 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds.) [hereinafter Constitutions] (Canada);
Australian Const. arts. 51, 52, reproduced in 1 Constitutions, supra at 39-41; 8 Constitutions, supra
at 23 (observing that Indian Constitution is "fundamental" law and that courts may declare contrary
law unconstitutional).
79. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
80. Legomsky, Specialized Justice, supra note 73, at 86.
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Thus, one additional reason for members of Parliament to regard
broad delegations to the executive branch as appropriate is that in
practice the executive holds the cards anyway. For the United States
Congress, such delegations entail the surrender of more actual
policymaking power.
There is yet another reason for the United States Congress to be less
freewheeling in its delegations to the executive. Even though in
parliamentary countries the executive branch as a whole has much more
power vis-a-vis the legislature than is true in the United States, power
within the executive branch seems to be more dispersed in parliamentary
countries. When the President of the United States disagrees with the
Attorney General or the Secretary of State, there is no question whose
view will prevail. The executive branch of the United States, as others
have observed, is a hierarchical structure."
In contrast, in most parliamentary systems, the full Cabinet decides on
policy and it does so by consensus rather than by majority vote. The
principle is called collective accountability, and it tends to decrease the
chances of radical change.82 Perhaps the absence of a collective
accountability principle in the United States further diminishes
Congress's confidence in the executive branch and its resultant
willingness to delegate away broad responsibilities.
B. Congressional and Executive Attributes
The above discussion portrays separation of powers as a vehicle for
preserving individual liberty and for promoting good, effective
government. The same discussion illustrates some of the separation
models that various democracies have chosen. In particular, as the
authors of the Federalist Papers and modern writers have recognized,
separation of powers does not require that the legislative83 function be
vacuum-sealed within a single branch of government. In the United
81. See, eg., Glennon, supra note 72, at 28 (citing Sundquist, supra note 5).
82. Palmer, supra note 77, at 40,45.
83. Both the executive branch, through its network of specialized administrative tribunals, and the
judicial branch, through the general courts, adjudicate cases and create additional law in the process.
For present purposes, I put case law aside and confine my focus to legislative processes such as
enactment of statutes and executive rulemaking. I recognize too that the judiciary also engages in
rulemaking, for example by promulgating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and local rules of court. The present
article, which is concerned only with the allocation of legislative power between Congress and the
executive, does not consider the subject ofjudicial rulernaking.
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States today, both Congress and the executive branch are prolific sources
of legislation; Congress passes statutes, and the executive branch issues
executive orders, regulations, and other subordinate legislation.
Each of these two branches possesses attributes that both positively
and negatively affect its fitness to perform legislative functions. For ease
of discussion, I shall divide those attributes into two groups: those that
flow from the composition of the two branches, and those that derive
from the processes they use.
1. Composition
In theory, Congress brings to its work a greater diversity than is
possible for the President-a single individual-to bring. Members of
Congress affiliate with at least two different political parties. They are of
different ethnic heritages and different religions. They are women and
men. They are from different geographic regions a-nd from urban,
suburban, and rural districts. They are of different ages and ideologies.
They bring differing professional backgrounds and life experiences.
Whatever homogeneity admittedly exists among those whose financial
and political assets permitted them to win election to Congress, surely
there is more diversity in a large Congress than in a single President.
Congress is relatively diverse in the additional sense that its members
represent diverse constituencies. Congressional districts are in different
states, are of different physical sizes, are dominated by different political
parties, and have different social, economic, ethnic, and demographic
characteristics. The President, of course, represents the entire nation.
Because he is only one person, however, the President's political base is
likely to be associated, predominantly or at least disproportionately, with
one particular political party and other distinct subgroups.
Some would stress, however, that "diverse" does not necessarily
translate into "representative." Two politically conservative editors (at a
time when the Democrats controlled Congress and the Republicans
controlled the White House) argued for a reduced congressional role and
a correspondingly more assertive Presidency." They attacked Congress
as unrepresentative, stressing that in 1986 Republican congressional
candidates had captured 45% of the vote but had received only 41% of
the seats. 5 As an argument for transferring power from Congress to the
President, that observation accomplishes little if anything, even if one
84. Jones & Marini, supra note 6.
85. Id. at 8.
Vol. 70:675, 1995
Refugee Policy and Separation of Powers
attaches great significance to a differential of 4%. The most obvious
difficulty with the argument is that one could lodge the same objection
even more dramatically in any presidential race, where it is common for
the losing candidate to receive nearly half the vote and come away with
none of the Presidency.
Admittedly, though, Congress's capacity for broad representation
might be more theoretical than real. Factors like gerrymandering, the
efforts of special interest groups, the systematic powerlessness of
particular minorities within congressional districts, variations in the
campaign war chests of opposing candidates, and the unequal impact of
the various members all diminish Congress's ability to provide equal
representation.
Moreover, one should not understate the diversity or the representative
capacity of the Presidency. Even though the President is only one person,
the executive lawmaking power is dispersed among Cabinet members
(admittedly of the President's choosing) and their subordinates.
A related difference between Congress and the President lies in their
formal constituencies. Members of Congress depend on local
constituents for re-election; the President (at least once) must look to a
more national constituency. That difference gives individual members of
Congress an incentive to hone in on local, and more parochial, issues,
and to respond to specific grievances brought to them by constituents.86
Some might view these dynamics as a positive way for Congress to get a
better sense of the popular pulse. Others might see them more as a
breeding ground for pork barrel projects and other legislation collectively
harmful to the nation as a whole.
The congressional structure also generates some pertinent differences
in the lawmaking capabilities of Congress and the executive.
Congressional bicameralism enables representatives and senators from
the same state to monitor the interests of different constituencies. There
is no analogous safeguard in the executive branch, although White House
approval of contemplated agency regulations arguably serves some of the
same functions.
Although some individual members of Congress serve for decades, the
composition of the overall Congress changes every two years. The
President, in contrast, is normally in office for four years or eight years.
These rapid changes in Congress are both good and bad. On the one
86. See Sundquist, supra note 5, at 441.
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hand, they hinder Congress's capacity for long-term planning. 7 On the
other hand, at least in the House of Representatives, the relentless
proximity of elections might make members more :responsive to the
people."8
The organizational structures of Congress and the Presidency also
differ in their degrees of centralization. In contrast to the formal
hierarchy of the executive branch is a congressional operation in which
all members are at least theoretically equal. Congressional leaders have
little influence over members of the opposition, and, even on their own
side of the aisle, party discipline cannot provide the same degree of
control that the President can exert over his or her ;ubordinates. This
difference should not, of course, be exaggerated. The combination of
powerful House leadership, the majority caucus, and the committee
structure can achieve significant centralization within the majority
party.89
Finally, Congress and the executive branch might differ with respect
to degree of specialized expertise. Here, however, it is not clear which
way that difference cuts. First, as a practical matter, both branches today
have access to large bodies of expert information. Apart from whatever
expertise individual members of Congress happen to b:ing on their own,
Congress benefits from the specialized knowledge of experts on
members' staffs, experts who work for the General Accounting Office or
the Congressional Research Service, and experts who testify before
congressional committees. The President has access to similar experts on
the White House staff and in the vast network of administrative agencies.
Second, even if one branch is seen as possessing greater specialized
expertise than the other, that specialization can be a mbed blessing."
2. Process
With both composition and process in mind, it has been common to
associate Congress with "deliberation '  and the executive with such
87. Douglas A. Jeffrey, Executive Authority Under the Separation ofPocers, in Jones & Marini,
supra note 6, at 41, 44.
88. Or, some would say, more subject to shifting political winds.
89. Sundquist, supra note 5, at 162-79.
90. The benefits and costs of specialization in the context of adjudication are discussed in detail in
Legomsky, Specialized Justice, supra note 73, at 7-32. Analogous ccnsiderations inform the
applicability of these pros and cons to legislation.
91. See, e.g., Jeffrey, supra note 87, at 44-45; John A. Marini, Introduction, in Jones & Marini,
supra note 6, at 16.
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qualities as "decision", "activity", "secrecy", "dispatch", and "energy
The contrast that these words are usually meant to convey is between a
Congress best equipped to debate and then legislate and a President best
equipped to command the executive hierarchy and to implement. In
constitutional parlance, the President "shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed." 3
The public nature of the congressional process might be seen as
enhancing Congress's suitability for legislation. The input of citizens and
lobbyists during committee hearings affords at least some of those who
might be affected by proposed legislation an opportunity to be heard.
The public committee hearings and floor debates, combined with
published transcripts of those hearings, committee reports, and the
recording of floor debates in the Congressional Record, assure at least
some public scrutiny of the legislative process. In contrast, the secrecy
for which the executive process is touted makes it a less desirable
lawmaking body in a representative democracy.
That distinction, however, should not be overrated. Important
negotiations obviously occur behind closed doors in Congress as well.
Conversely, within the executive branch, the notice and comment
procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act in formal
rulemaking assure some measure of public input.94 Still, only certain
categories of rules are subject to those procedures, 95 and even then, the
written documents that the procedures contemplate are not the same as
oral testimony or as public debate by the ultimate decisionmakers.
The discussion up to this point might prompt the conclusion that
neither an imperial Congress nor an imperial President is either necessary
or desirable. Each branch supplies vital nutrients to a constitutional
scheme that shares powers rather than separates them. A statute, passed
by Congress after substantial public input and in full public view, and
then signed by the President, can supply the best of both worlds-a
product that bears a joint seal of approval and that embodies a degree of
legitimacy less attainable by one branch acting alone.
But certain advantages of the executive process over the legislative
process qualify that conclusion. First, the executive structure gives it an
advantage in comprehensive planning. Its hierarchial anatomy enables it
92. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 72, at 28-29; Jeffrey, supra note 87, at 44; Kesler, supra note
9, at 28; Marini, supra note 6, at 16.
93. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
94. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
95. Id.
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to bring together warring factions in a way that Congress's bicameralism
and Congress's committee system do not.96
The executive also enjoys a speed advantage. The inner workings of
the congressional process reflect the framers' conception of Congress as
a slow, deliberative body. Committees and subcommittees study issues
thoroughly, and floor debate can be lengthy.97 Consequently, Congress
has little choice but to delegate to the executive those policy decisions
that require speed-including many in the area of foreign affairs.98
Another barrier to exclusive statutory lawmaking is that Congress
adjourns from time to time. The President, in contrast, is always "in
session. '
In the end, there is no perfect lawmaking branch. Both Congress and
the executive have shortcomings that inherently affect the timing or
quality of the "laws" they produce. In the next two parts, the process for
setting United States refugee policy will be assessed in the light of those
shortcomings.
III. SEPARATING POWERS AND SELECTING REFUGEES
A. Selection of Overseas Refugees in the United Statesl'o
The U. S. statutory definition of "refugee" is modeled on that of the
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.''
The statute requires "a well-foumded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.""1 2
96. Sundquist, supra note 5, at 158-59.
97. Compare this to New Zealand, where the combination of executive domination and tight party
discipline impels Parliament to chum out what its former Prime Minister alls "The Fastest Law in
the West" See Palmer, supra note 77, ch. 9.
98. Sundquist, supra note 5, at 156-57; see also Henkin, supra note 8, at 27 (noting that President
can act quickly and informally, unlike Congress).
99. Henkin, supra note 8, at 27.
100. The overseas refugee program is to be distinguished from the asylum program, which is for
the refugee who is already "physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of
entry" INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994).
101. July 28, 1951, art. I.A., 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152-54. Although article 33 of the Convention
prohibits signatories from deporting or returning refugees to territories in which their lives or
freedom would be threatened on specified grounds, nothing in the Conventihn affirmatively requires
signatories to admit refugees in the first place.
102. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1I01(a)(42) (1994).
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Also by statute, the President each year sets the maximum number of
refugees who may be admitted during the upcoming fiscal year0 3-
112,000 in fiscal year 1995.104 The President also specifies how that total
is to be allocated among the various countries or world regions from
which the refugees are fleeing."°5 The President may admit additional
refugees in the event of "an unforeseen refugee emergency."106 The
President's discretion is not subject to any statutory maxima or minima.
Before making either determination, however, the President must engage
in "appropriate consultation,"' 7 defined to include personal discussion
between Cabinet-level representatives of the President and members of
the pertinent congressional committees.'
Once the President announces the upper limits, the Attorney General
coordinates the selection of individual applicants. Subject to those limits,
the Attorney General may admit any refugees who are not "firmly
resettled" in a foreign country, are of "special humanitarian concern to
the United States," and do not fall within the various immigrant
exclusion grounds."° In practice, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, with the aid of the State Department and various
nongovernmental organizations, adjudicates overseas refugee
applications."0 They employ a list of four "processing priorities" that
relate generally to the immediacy of the danger and the applicant's
family ties to the United States."'
In the public mind, United States refugee policy is often associated
with altruism and compassion. The common assumption is that the
refugee program is meant to alleviate the suffering of fellow human
beings who have been forced from their homelands. Overlaid on this
humanitarian depiction of refugee admissions is the related assumption
103. INA § 207(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2).
104. U.S. Comm. for Refugees, 15 Refugee Reports No. 12 at 20 (1994).
105. The groups of refugees designated are those whom the President finds to be "of special
humanitarian concern to the United States." INA § 207(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3).
106. INA § 207(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b).
107. INA § 207(ab), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a), (b).
108. INA § 207(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e).
109. INA § 207(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1). The exclusion grounds reflect a variety of national
concerns, including public health, crime, welfare use, national security, and the integrity of the
immigration process itself. See INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). The admissibility requirement is
subject to various exemptions. INA § 207(c)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3).
110. See generally Lawyers Committee, supra note 60.
111. A detailed description of the priority categories appears in U.S. Comm. for Refugees, 15
Refugee Reports No. 12, at 6-7 (1994).
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that the admission of refugees is a response to violations of fundamental
human rights.
As others have observed,"' however, neither a humanitarian model
nor a human rights model adequately explains the actual development of
refugee law. If humanitarianism were the driving force, some have asked,
why is the legal definition of refugee constricted to those who flee
persecution? Surely those who flee war, famine, or other threats to life
can make equally compelling moral claims to international protection."'
Similarly, if the overriding goal were promotion of human rights, why
would the United States statute admit only those refugees who are of
"special humanitarian concern to the United States"?"14
The clear answer to these and similar questions is that United States
refugee law has never been rooted solely, or even primarily, in either
humanitarianism or human rights. Rather, as many others have noted
with disapproval," 5 the central thrust of United States refugee policy has
always been the pursuit of national self-interest-in particular, foreign
policy goals, and more particularly the battle against Communism.
Provisions that had expressly limited refugee admissions to those who
were fleeing either a "Communist-dominated" country or a country
within the Middle East"6 disappeared with the enactment of the Refugee
Act of 1980,17 but the actual pattern of refugee selection has remained
largely intact. In every year, the President has reserved the overwhelming
bulk of the refugee slots for refugees from Communism."
Even in the few years that have followed the collapsie of Communism
in the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe, refugees from
112. See James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31
Harv. Int'l L. 129 (1990).
113. See id.; cf. Deborah Perluss & Joan F. Hartmnan, Temporary lAefuge: Emergence of a
Customary Norm, 26 Va. J. Int'l L. 551 (1986) (arguing that customary iternational law requires
protection for those fleeing dangers beyond persecution).
114. INA § 207(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § I157(a)(3) (1994).
115. E.g., Elizabeth Hull, Without Justice for All-The Constitutional Rights ofAliens 115-46 (1985);
Gil Loescher & John A. Scanlan, Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America's Half-Open Door 1945-
Present (1986); Joan Fitzpatrick &Robert Patrv, Foreign Policy, Asyiun and Dscretion, 28 XWillamette L.
Rev. 751,762-65 (1992); Hathaway, supra note 112.
116. Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911, 913 (1965), amending INA § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(a)(7).
117. Pub. L. No. 96-212,94 Stat. 102 (1980).
118. See Legomsky, supra note 31, at 835-36 (and 1994 Supplement, supra note 4, at 47-49)
(vast majority of slots allocated to refugees from former Soviet Union and from Southeast Asia). For
fiscal year 1995, these two regions account for 88,000 of the 112,000 autho:ized refugee admissions.
See U.S. Comm. for Refugees, 15 Refugee Reports No. 12, at 9 (1994).
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Communism have continued to dominate United States refugee
admissions." 9 While less clearly connected to foreign policy, the present
emphasis on Indochinese and Soviet refugees largely reflects foreign
policy-driven commitments that were made in past years. As others have
noted,12' however, constituent pressures and other domestic political
forces have also played prominent roles. I believe that these domestic
political pressures are themselves a reason to entrust refugee selection
decisions to an independent Board relatively insulated from narrowly
defined interest groups, but the present discussion will focus on the
proper role of foreign affairs in selecting among refugees.
Some might feel there is nothing wrong in linking refugee selection so
closely to foreign policy considerations. Certainly a principled defense is
possible. There are far more refugees in the world than the United States
has the absorptive capacity to admit. Somehow, therefore, we have to
select from within the class of people we denominate as refugees. What
is the harm, defenders of the present policy might ask, in selecting those
refugees who also happen to serve our foreign policy interests?
My own view is that enlisting foreign policy as the principal device
for ranking refugees perhaps would be unobjectionable if all who met
our refugee definition were otherwise fungible. The problem is that they
are not. First, there are degrees of risk. One refugee might face a 40%
chance of persecution while another faces a 90% chance. Second, there
are degrees of persecution. One refugee might face restrictions on
religious freedom while another faces death. With apologies to Learned
Hand,"' one can distinguish within the class of refugees both by the
likelihood of persecution and by the harm they will face if the threatened
persecution materializes. I would prefer a refugee selection system that
rests largely on those kinds of considerations to one that is driven
principally by foreign policy."
119. See supra note 118.
120. E.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, General Counsel of the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Oral Comments at Symposium, University of Washington School of Law
(May 6, 1995).
121. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding that
negligence requires a balancing of the likelihood of harm, the gravity of harm, and the burden of
taking adequate precautions).
122. At the risk of stating the obvious, I do not wish to speak of foreign policy as if it were a dirty
word. United States foreign policy decisions speak volumes about our nation's values, and in this
increasingly shrinking world they have incalculable tangible effects both on the day-to-day lives of
Americans and on the populations of other nations. The only issue I am addressing here is the role
that foreign affairs should play specifically in shaping United States refugee policy. Moreover, even
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How these forces will shape substantive United States refugee policy
in the post-Cold War era remains unclear. There are at least four possible
scenarios: (1) continued concentration on refugees from Communist
countries, either despite the changing political topology or in keeping
with any future resurgence of Communism; (2) continued emphasis on
foreign policy concerns, and particularly on refugees fleeing
governments adversarial to the United States, but with Communist
countries constituting progressively lower proportions of these
"adversarial nations;" (3) increased emphasis on huraanitarianism and
human rights as factors in selecting among refugees, and attendant
deemphasis on foreign policy; and (4) sizeable reductions in the total
numbers of refugees admitted, as the driving force--combatting
Communism-gradually peters out."
Those of us who wish to preserve refugee admissions for reasons
grounded in humanitarianism and human rights should view some of
these possibilities with concern if not alarm. While recognizing that
refugee programs in the United States and a small number of other
nations cannot ultimately save more than a fractioa of the world's
refugees,124 that fraction can translate into millions oF people over the
course of time.
Naturally, all this raises difficult questions about the direction of
substantive refugee policy. In addition, however, it is time to consider the
link between the processes for formulating that policy and the ultimate
outcomes that those processes can be expected to produce. As long as the
major responsibility for making refugee policy resides in the executive
branch, is it inevitable that foreign affairs will drive those decisions? Are
there alternatives? Finally, apart from issues as to the proper role of
foreign affairs in shaping United States refugee policy, are there
independent reasons to transfer refugee policy determinations to another
place? These and other themes are explored in the subsections that
follow.
in that specific context, I am concerned with its role only relative to the roles of humanitarianism and
human rights.
123. The State Department has predicted sharp reductions in total overseas refugee admissions
once the current pipeline of Soviet and Indochinese refugees has been cleared. See Robert S.
Greenberger, U.S. Faces Pressure to Set New Policy on Refugees Amid Prospects of an Influx, Wall
St. J., Dec. 30, 1991, at A6 (quoting Hon. Princeton Lyman).
124. As of November 1992, there were about 18,000,000 refugees in the world. Statement of Hon.
Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Nov. 10, 1992) in 4 Int'l .
Refugee L. 541, 542 (1992). In fiscal year 1995, the United States will admit up to 112,000. U.S.
Comm. for Refugees, 15 Refugee Reports No. 12, at 9 (1994).
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B. The Problem with Presidents
The present system of entrusting refugee policy largely to the
President has real advantages over a system of congressional refugee
selection. To minimize redundancy, I defer the discussion of those
advantages to the next subsection. The present subsection will focus only
on the down side of presidential refugee determinations.
The first cost, at least for those who believe that refugee policy should
turn more on humanitarian aspirations and human rights protection than
on foreign affairs, is the inherent unreality of expecting such an ordering
of priorities from a President. In international circles, no individual
speaks for the United States with more authority than the President does.
Whatever debate there might be about the precise location of the
constitutional line that separates congressional and presidential powers in
the realm of foreign affairs," few would deny that the presidential
responsibility for American foreign policy is substantial. Nor can one
discount the influence of the State Department, whose central mission
inevitably infuses presidential refugee determinations with a heavy dose
of foreign affairs.
A second cost of presidential decisioumaking in this area is a specific
application of the general principle, discussed earlier, that major policy
decisions should be the province of Congress. As has been noted,
Congress enjoys the advantages of greater diversity, closer ties to local
constituents, earlier accountability because of more frequent elections (in
the House of Representatives only), more opportunity for public input
into the process, and more visibly open deliberation. 126 The overall size
and shape of our overseas refugee policy are major policy decisions.
Third, the traditional legislative process, with its combination of
congressional approval and presidential assent, formally incorporates the
representational virtues of both branches. In that way, the procedure
enhances the public perception of legitimacy. By vesting a major policy
decision exclusively 27 in the President and his delegates, the present
refugee selection system cedes some portion of that legitimacy.
Fourth, since Congress decides what funds to appropriate, assigning to
the President the ultimate responsibility of setting refugee quotas
125. On that subject, the classic work is Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
(1972); see also Henkin, supra note 8.
126. See supra part I.B.
127. I acknowledge the consultation requirement, but the point here is that the final decision rests
with the President.
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bifurcates the substantive policy decision and the funding decision. That
such bifurcation can be problematic became evident in 1992, when the
President proposed maintaining approximately the existing level of
refugee admissions while Congress drastically cut the funding for
resettling them.128
Fifth, in the more general context of the United States immigration
structure, the refugee process sticks out like a sore thumb. For every
other major category of permanent migration-family, employment, and
diversity-Congress has prescribed a complex and detailed system of
numerical ceilings and priorities.'29 Yet, with respect to refugees,
Congress has delegated analogous decisions to the President. The
segregation of one central component of immigration policy raises
concerns for the overall coherence of that policy. Are there good reasons
to employ such fundamentally differing approaches?
Refugees are, of course, different from other immigrants in important
ways. By definition, they face higher than usual risks of serious harm.
They are unable to turn to their own governments for protection. And
they are more likely to have been emotionally traumatized. But none of
these factors explains the particular process differences at issue here.
There are, however, at least two possibilities. Refugee flows can be
sudden and unpredictable. Consequently, those who make refugee policy
must be prepared to respond promptly and flexibly. On that score, as
noted earlier, the President is better situated than Congress. Still, the next
subsection will explore some ways in which Congress could minimize
those difficulties and still assume the major responsibility for refugee
selection policy.
The other possible reason for singling out refugee selection as the one
major immigration policy that Congress has generally abdicated to the
President might be the perceived link between refugee issues and foreign
affairs. When the United States declares someone a refugee, it is
implicitly concluding that the country of origin is either engaged in
persecution or unwilling or unable to protect its own inhabitants from
persecution by others. Concededly, such expressions of opinion are
potentially damaging to foreign relations.
But even that explanation seems inadequate. For reasons discussed
earlier, whether foreign policy should play so prominent a role in refugee
selection is debatable in the first place. Moreover, to link refugee policy
128. U.S. Comm. for Refugees, 13 Refugee Reports No. 7 (1992).
129. See supra part I.B.
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to foreign affairs is hardly a basis for distinguishing refugee policy from
all of the other immigration policies of which Congress has taken charge.
Indeed, for more than one hundred years, the Supreme Court has
affirmatively invoked the link between immigration and foreign affairs
as a justification for recognizing a plenary congressional power over
immigration.30 Finally, although United States refugee policy can affect
foreign relations, it can have large domestic implications as well.
Congress would normally be the logical organ for balancing the various
domestic and foreign repercussions.
At bottom, then, ultimate presidential control of refugee selection
policy generates some substantial concerns. Would congressional control
be better?
C. The Problem with Congress
Previous discussion has illustrated the President's relative strengths
and one of Congress's relative drawbacks: the slower and more
cumbersome nature of the legislative process.' Again, refugee policy
must be responsive to rapidly changing world conditions. If Congress
had to legislate every year, and especially if it had frequent additional
need to legislate ad hoc in response to new emergencies, serious
problems could arise.
To be sure, there are ways to surmount, or at least to lower, that
barrier. Congress could, for example, enact permanent legislation that
either authorizes up to a certain number of annual refugee admissions or
mandates that the number admitted fall within a prescribed numerical
range. Either way, the statute could confer discretion on the President or
other executive officer within those constraints. The statute could also
prescribe preference categories analogous to those for family,
employment, and diversity immigrants.' Congress could create sub-
ceilings or sub-ranges for those preference categories and, if it wished, it
could exempt certain high-priority refugees from those sub-limits
entirely. Because the aim would be to avoid the need for frequent
amendments, any such priorities should be personal (e.g., immediate
130. See the sources cited in supra note 22.
131. To the extent that slowness adds care and mature reflection, it is also an advantage. See
Palmer, supra note 77, ch. 9. In the refugee field, perhaps it would not be bad for policy decisions to
lag some distance behind volatile changes in public sentiment
132. INA § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
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danger, close family ties to United States citizens or residents)... rather
than country-specific. Indeed, if the priorities are designed principally to
promote humanitarianism and human rights, the absence of country
specifications would be a positive virtue.
To preserve flexibility, Congress could add several features. It could
retain the present provision authorizing the President to respond to
unforeseen emergencies with additional admissions.134 The legislation
could also require the General Accounting Office or a specified
executive branch agency to monitor the world refugee situation
continuously and provide regular reports to the appropriate congressional
committees.
The above solution would still leave the President with the very broad
discretion to choose the number of refugees and their countries of origin.
Although narrower than the freedom the President enjoys under present
law, such a grant of power would reproduce many of the flaws of the
existing process. In particular, Congress would still be abdicating a large
chunk of its duty to make major policy decisions. The advantage of this
congressional abdication is that the system would retain the flexibility to
respond quickly to rapidly changing refugee flows.
An alternative would be for Congress to enact permanent legislation
defining the refugee priority categories, but to enact annual legislation
setting the number of refugee numbers for the upcoming year for each
priority category. Again, there could be provision for presidential
authorizations of unforeseen emergency numbers and for continuous
executive monitoring and reporting. To assure annual congressional
action, the House and Senate rules could build such decisionmaking into
the appropriations process. This alternative exacts the opposite kind of
tradeoff: it accepts a more cumbersome process in exchange for a greater
congressional policymaking role.
An intermediate option would be for Congress to attempt the
preceding strategy, but to provide for continuation cf the prior year's
refugee numbers as the default option. In the event of political stalemate,
the continued admission of refugees would be assured.
Inflexible as it might initially sound, that last strategy would have real
advantages. Since there is no present danger that the world's refugee
supply will suddenly shrink below the level that any Congress is likely to
prescribe, future Presidents are not going to find themselves unable to fill
133. These are the current INS and State Department priority categories. See supra note 111.
134. INA § 207(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b).
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prior years' mandates. Rather, if the statutory numbers are deemed too
high for successive years, it will be because of domestic concerns about
the nation's absorptive capacity-concerns not likely to fluctuate
dramatically from year to year. In any event, the problem would be no
greater for refugees than for any other category of immigrants, whose
numbers are also set by statute. Moreover, if the situation became
sufficiently serious, Congress could enact either permanent or ad hoe
corrective legislation. Conversely, if the old statutory numbers became
too low, Congress could similarly pass remedial legislation or the
President could invoke his or her special authority to admit additional
refugees in unforeseen emergencies.
I would prefer any one of these options to the status quo. Admittedly,
however, each one is subject either to the criticism that it still leaves too
much basic policy discretion with the President or to the criticism that it
imposes unrealistically cumbersome burdens on an already overburdened
Congress.
A congressional takeover of refugee selection policies would also
generate other, smaller concerns. As in any other area, congressional
structures do not lend themselves ideally to either long-term or
comprehensive planning.'35 Both are crucial in an area like refugee
policy, not only because today's admission decisions can affect
tomorrow's demography, but also because refugee policy decisions
intersect with those in other subject areas.
As in other areas, Congress might be perceived as having local,
constituent-based attachments too parochial for national refugee policy
determinations. It might also be thought too vulnerable to lobbyists. But
these limitations can influence national legislation in practically any
subject area; we accept them as the price for both federalism and
separation of powers.
The relatively more public congressional process might also be of
concern, for openness can bring embarrassment. But the flip side of
openness is secrecy, and that too has its dangers. Moreover, some would
question whether truly confidential information is any more likely to leak
from Congress than it is to leak from the executive branch.136
So the only major disadvantages of a meaningful congressional role in
the refugee selection process are the slowness and relative rigidity of the
congressional structure. These are, however, major costs, and those
135. See supra notes 86,95 and accompanying text.
136. E.g., Glennon, supra note 72, at 27-28.
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forms of congressional involvement that substantially avoid these costs
do so only by granting the President a wide area of unbridled discretion.
Given the tendency for Presidents to tie refugee policy so closely to
foreign affairs, that large residue of discretion is troublesome.
D. Congressional and Presidential Power-Sharing
If either congressional or presidential control of refugee selection
policy poses substantial difficulties, would some sort of power-sharing
arrangement solve the problem? One might categorize the existing
consultation requirement as a form of power-sharing, but as noted earlier
the President alone makes the ultimate decision. Similarly, any of the
statutory schemes discussed in the preceding subsection would inherently
represent a sharing of power in the sense that the statute itself would
require both congressional approval and presidential assent (unless the
statute resulted from a veto override). Some of those hypothetical
statutes would reflect power-sharing in the additional sense that they call
for Congress to make some decisions and the President to make others.
There are, however, many other possibilities. For ease of discussion, I
separate them into two groups. Some simply divvy up the various
functions between Congress and the President. Others would require the
joint approval of all major decisional components by both branches.
In the first group, one possible approach would be: for Congress to
enact permanent legislation that describes the general goals of the
refugee program in broad language. If Congress were so inclined, it
could preserve the present system but specify that the President is to base
all refugee selections primarily on humanitarian and human rights
criteria rather than on foreign affairs criteria. To take that tack would still
represent a large delegation of congressional power, however, and in any
event a President who wished to select refugees on the basis of foreign
policy concerns would have little difficulty in finding humanitarian and
human rights rationales that purported to explain the final decision.
Another possibility would be annual congressional passage of bills
that prescribe specific numbers of refugees to be admited from specific
countries or regions, but with a line-item veto that would permit the
President to delete particular allotments. Constitutional questions aside,
such an approach would probably embody the worst of both worlds.
Annual congressional action would be cumbersome, Congress would be
ceding to the President the authority to block the admission of whichever
refugees he or she wished, and the President's decisions could still be
made largely on foreign policy grounds.
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Other power-sharing approaches might entail consent by both
branches to all major components of the refugee selection decision. In
theory, one such possibility is for Congress to retain some power to
review the President's refugee designations. In the past, Congress freely
employed legislative vetoes to constrain the substantive policy discretion
of administrative agencies. 137 But that practice ended with INS v.
Chadha,131 where the Supreme Court struck down a provision that had
authorized a one-House veto of agency action. The Court held the
provision amounted to legislation without the constitutionally prescribed
legislative procedures. In a later case, the Court summarily affirmed a
lower court decision striking down a two-House veto. 139
Laurence Tribe has suggested that Congress, consistently with
Chadha, could delegate the authority to issue rules but stipulate that
those rules would not take effect unless and until both Houses of
Congress affirmatively approve them by joint resolution and present
them to the President."4 Since such a procedure would comprise both
bicameral approval and presidential assent, and since those were the two
elements of the constitutional process that the Court in Chadha believed
Congress had circumvented, there should be no constitutional obstacle.
In effect, Congress would be treating the President as an advisory, or
reporting, agency. Again, though, the problem would be the annual need
for both Houses of Congress to reach agreement on the specifics of
refugee policy when rapidly changing world conditions might demand
prompt action.
A final possibility would be to continue to delegate the broad refugee
selection power to the President but to provide that the President's
designations do not become effective until some specified time after they
have been reported officially to Congress.141 Time-delay mechanisms
would avoid the necessity of affirmative congressional action but would
enable Congress to supersede the President's decision legislatively if it
wished to do so and if it could either deter or override a presidential veto.
Again, however, the potential for long delays would be problematic in a
setting that often demands speedy responses to sudden shifts in the world
refugee picture. Moreover, congressional consensus within the statutorily
prescribed time limits will often be difficult. When such consensus does
137. See, e.g., Abourezk, supra note 7; Strauss, supra note 7.
138. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
139. United States Senate v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
140. Tribe, supra note 65, at 218 n.27.
141. Id. at 217-18.
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not materialize, all the problems associated with unilateral presidential
control of refugee selection remain.
In the end, none of these solutions is fully satisfying. Some leave the
basic policy decision in the hands of the President, to whom foreign
relations will continue to loom large. Other solutions would return the
major policy responsibility to Congress, but they would necessitate slow
and cumbersome procedures in a field that cries out for speed and
flexibility. It is time, I believe, for an entirely different approach.
IV. AN INDEPENDENT REFUGEE BOARD
142
As the discussion to this point has demonstrated, the congressional
process is not geared to making annual determinations of how many
refugees the United States is to admit and the countries from which they
are to come. The partial solutions discussed in the preceding subsection
are plausible but insufficient. As a practical mattei, Congress must
delegate this responsibility to someone.
Under current law, that someone is the President. The chief problem
with that arrangement is that the President, by virtue of his or her office
and responsibilities, will inevitably give overriding emphasis to the
foreign policy ramifications of refugee selection decisions. If Congress
believes that refugee policies should turn primarily on humanitarian and
human rights considerations, then it needs to find a new delegate. I
propose it create an Independent Refugee Board for this purpose.
If Congress were to follow that course, the nondelegation principle
discussed earlier would require only that Congress articulate an
"intelligible principle" for the Board to follow. 143 To that end, the
legislation should first lay out the general goals of the program that the
new Board would be shaping. Congress should say explicitly that the
principal goals are to ease the suffering of refugees and to promote
observance of human rights. Congress should also supply categorical
priorities, analogous to those now in use by the INS and the State
Department.' 44
142. For a good discussion of the merits of an analogous independeat board, see Kevin R.
Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch
Primacy over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 413, 451-53 (1993). Unlike the Board proposed here,
the board that Professor Johnson considers would address a wide range of immigration issues and
would perform only adjudicative functions.
143. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1928).
144. See supra note 111.
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The main job of the new Board would be to announce the total annual
refugee admission levels and, within the above statutory constraints, the
bases for choosing among competing applicants. Congress here has
several sub-options: It could require the Board to specify geographic
areas from which the refugees are to be drawn; it could prohibit the use
of geographic criteria altogether, opting instead for a system that
prioritizes refugees solely on other grounds; or it could entrust to the
Board the discretion whether to employ geographic criteria. Congress
could also insist that the Board report its designations at least a specified
number of months before the start of the fiscal year. Then, if Congress
objected strongly to a particular decision, it would have time to pass
corrective legislation for that year.
Congress should also prescribe procedural guidelines for the Board to
follow. Notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure, with its emphasis on
public input, would be worth requiring.145 The legislation should require
the Board to monitor the world refugee situation by communicating
regularly with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, the International Organization for Migration, the United States
Department of State, the INS, and relevant nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). Congress should also require the Board to
monitor domestic refugee resettlement operations by maintaining close
contact with the Department of Health and Human Services, NGOs, and
other relevant sources of information.
The statute should preserve the existing presidential power to admit
additional refugees in the event of an unforeseen emergency and should
require the Board to make recommendations to the President concerning
the exercise of that power. In addition, Congress should require the
Board to file periodic reports with the appropriate congressional
committees and with the President. Congress should also conduct regular
and ad hoc oversight hearings to stay abreast of world refugee
conditions.
It would be possible for the legislation to delegate additional functions
to this new Board. It could, for example, require the Board to provide
information and training to the INS and State Department personnel who
adjudicate individual refugee applications. It could go a step further,
145. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) exempts from the formal rulemaking requirements
any rule that involves "a foreign affairs function of the United States." 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (1994).
Since some would say refugee determinations fit that description, the statute that creates the refugee
agency should specifically require formal rulemaking unless in a given instance it would be
"impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" (the current APA language). 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(B) (1994).
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making this Board responsible for the overall administration of the
overseas refugee program, including the adjudication component.
Congress would have to make the usual decisions concerning the
appointment and removal of Board members. These decisions would
need to reflect the appropriate tradeoff between independence and
accountability.' Congress could opt for presidential appointment and
prescribe fixed terms, either with or without the possibility of renewal.
One option would be a two-term limit.
In many ways, the proposed Board would resemble the United States
Sentencing Commission, an independent body established by Congress
to issue binding sentencing ranges for federal crimes.47 It too operates
under very general congressional guidelines that the Supreme Court in
Mistretta v. United States4' held compatible with fhe nondelegation
doctrine. Justice Scalia argued in dissent that Congress cannot
constitutionally create an agency, like the Sentencing Commission, that
has no function other than lawmaking. 49 He believed Congress could
constitutionally delegate only those lawmaking functions that were
incident to the agency's other executive or judicial[ responsibilities.
Importantly here, the majority rejected that position.
An independent Board charged with pronouncing the number and
breakdown of annual refugee admissions would bring several benefits. In
many ways, it would combine the deliberative qualities of the legislative
branch, the speed and flexibility of the executive branch, and the
impartiality and insulation of the judicial branch.
The deliberation that should characterize the operations of this
proposed Board would occur for two reasons: First, by monitoring the
world refugee situation continuously, the Board's members and staff
would have ample opportunity for mature reflection and collegial
exchanges that can help their thoughts on long-term refugee problems
and solutions to crystallize. Second, the Board's specialized expertise
would contribute to comprehensive understanding and sophisticated
analysis of what has become highly technical, complex subject matter.
While both these qualities are essential, however, I do not view them as
146. For a discussion of some of the subvariables in an analogous immigration context, see
Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the
Immigration Process, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1297, 1378-80 (1986).
147. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988).
The Sentencing Commission, however, is within the judicial branch rather thin the executive branch.
28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
148. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
149. Id. at 413, 417.
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arguments for this proposed refugee Board, since the specialized staffs of
congressional committees and executive branch departments have these
same traits.
The main advantage of the proposed Board over the existing system of
presidential refugee selection is that an independent Board whose
members enjoy fixed terms would be at least relatively removed from
partisan and pressure group influences.15 For that reason, even though
Presidents have chosen them, Board members should be less likely than
Presidents to make foreign affairs the driving force of a refugee selection
program. They could focus on finding facts and on making decisions that
reflect the needs of the refugees, the promotion of human rights, and all
the relevant domestic and international interests of the United States.
The principal advantage of the proposed Board over a system of
congressional selection of refugees would be that the Board, like the
President, could move quickly when conditions so require. The Board
could respond promptly to swiftly changing refugee needs. With
specialized expertise, with a steady stream of information from all the
major sources, and with constant attention to one specific task, the Board
would have the knowledge base to move firmly and aggressively when
necessary. With its small size and more flexible procedures, the Board's
processes would be similarly conducive to rapid response.
To be sure, independent agencies have their detractors."' Perhaps the
most forceful criticism has been their lack of political accountability.
Their members are not elected by the people and they are not removable
except by the President in extreme cases."'
That members of independent agencies are not elected by the people is
not a fatal characteristic. Neither are the heads or members of any other
administrative agencies or, for that matter, federal judges.
The more significant component of the accountability criticism is that
Board members are insulated from removal. When an agency makes
significant policy decisions, as would be true of the proposed refugee
Board, that criticism has teeth.
Still, there are several safeguards. There is some accountability as
long as Board members' terms are renewable. The enabling legislation
would place significant constraints on the Board's substantive policy
150. Some commentators believe that the actual political insulation of independent agencies is
often exaggerated. See the sources collected by Johnson, supra note 142, at 452 & n.186.
151. See, eg., Nolan E. Clark, The Headless Fourth Branch, in Jones & Marini, supra note 6, at
268-92; Jones & Marini, supra note 6.
152. See Clark, supra note 151, at 274-76, 280-81.
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discretion. The processes that the proposed statute reqtires the Board to
use would guarantee robust public input into the Board's decisions in all
but the most urgent situations. And if the people's representatives in
Congress object strongly to a particular decision by the Board, they can
supersede it by legislation. While it would be self-defeating to make such
legislation routine, the congressional check is there in the event of
refugee selections that deviate sharply from public opinion. If the
Board's decisions are made subject to statutory time delays, corrective
legislation would be plausible. Ultimately, if Congress finds continuing
serious problems with the policy decisions of the Board, it could admit
defeat, abolish the Board, and return to presidential refugee selection.
Related to the general concerns about political accountability,
however, would be concerns about the subject matter of this particular
delegation. Congress would be bypassing the President, entrusting to an
independent Board a policy decision with international implications.
That Congress is bypassing the President is not by itself a concern; but
for the logistical difficulties of committing itself to tanual legislation,
Congress could have chosen to make these decisions on its own. That
Congress is delegating a power to an independent Board is also not by
itself a problem; Congress delegates powers to indeperdent agencies all
the time. The difficulty lies in the combination. The proposed scheme
arguably means that neither of the two branches responsible for foreign
relations would have primary control over refugee determinations.
One cannot meet this criticism simply by opining that foreign affairs
should not control or even influence refugee selection decisions. For one
thing, reasonable minds can disagree on that issue. For another, the
problem is not just the impact of foreign affairs on refugee selection; it is
also the converse impact of refugee selection determinations on foreign
affairs. When policies will significantly affect United States foreign
relations, critics might say, one should not bypass both Congress and the
President.
Again, however, Congress would have the ultimate power to
supersede by legislation a Board decision to which it strongly objected.
Admittedly, a Congress that has a full menu of other issues competing
for its attention will not always find it practical to do so. When decisions
repugnant to Congress are left unanswered, and those decisions affect
foreign affairs or any other vital area of national policy, harm has
occurred.
One must acknowledge that those instances can occur, but
congressional acquiescence would be surprising if the Board's deviation
Vol. 70:675, 1995
Refugee Policy and Separation of Powers
from the congressional will were serious. Moreover, as discussed earlier,
Congress would still be able to set the basic parameters in advance, and
the proposed Board would then be in continuous permanent contact with
both Congress and the President. In any event, neither the status quo nor
any alternative proposal of which I am aware would solve the basic
problem with less institutional cost.
Apart from the safeguards just described, one can argue credibly that
in the refugee context political insulation is not only a positive virtue, but
a special necessity. Aliens are, after all, largely excluded from the
political process, and thus in particular need of protection by an
independent body." 3 Political alignments with individuals or institutions
in positions of greater power can occur when particular interests happen
to match up, 54 but such fortuities are no substitute for independent
lobbying strength.1
55
CONCLUSION
In immigration law, where the impact of policy decisions is both deep
and widespread and where those decisions rest heavily on both value
judgments and practical politics, the "Who decides?" question is central.
For the most part, Congress's answer has been "We decide." In our
representative democracy, that is precisely as it should be.
But in one major comer of immigration law Congress has deviated
from that philosophy. In our overseas refugee program, Congress has
granted the President almost unrestricted authority to decide each year
how many people will be admitted and which ones. Every President,
without exception, has chosen to allocate the overwhelming majority of
the refugee slots to those refugees who are fleeing Communist countries.
Seismic changes to the global political landscape demand
reconsideration of these priorities. Resistance to Communism can no
longer be the driving force of our overseas refugee program. The larger
question, though, is what the driving forces should be. Like many others,
I believe that the problem has been the willingness to let foreign relations
dominate our refugee policies as much as they have. Foreign affairs
considerations have a place in the formulation of refugee policy, but in
my view the principal determinants of United States refugee selection
153. Johnson, supra note 142, at 444, 456-59; Stephen H. Legomsky, Political Asylum and the
Theory ofJudicial Review, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 1205, 1208 (1989).
154. Schuck, supra note 2.
155. Legomsky, supra note 153, at 1208.
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should be humanitarian relief of suffering and the promotion of human
rights.
Reordering our refugee priorities in that way will be highly unlikely as
long as the final decisions reside exclusively with presidents.
Unfortunately, for reasons discussed at length in this article, Congress is
also poorly situated to make the kinds of rapid, periodic determinations
that volatile changes in the world refugee situation require.
My proposed solution is to create an Independent Refugee Board
whose central function would be to make annual determinations
somewhat akin to those now made by the President. Congress, through
permanent legislation, would provide more detailed guidance than it now
does. To that end, Congress would articulate the braad goals of the
overseas refugee program and would enact categorical, nongeographic
priorities to structure the exercise of the Board's discretion. Each year,
the Board would then translate those criteria into specific refugee
authorizations.
United States refugee policy can be as compassionate as we wish it to
be. But if we wish it to be more compassionate than it now is, the basic
decisionmaking structure will require radical surgery.
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